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Introduction: transnational law oversteps 
traditional categories 
In their book Transnational Legal Problems, first published in 1968, Detlev 
Vagts and Henry Steiner espoused Philip J essup' s term 'transnational law' 
as 'more than congenial' to them.1 'Transnational law' was meant by 
Jessup 'to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, 
as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories'.2 
In their seminal book, Steiner and Vagts sought to give principal attention 
to problems that were 'relevant not only to governments but also to the 
private participants - individual or corporate - in transnational life'. 3 They 
defied 'rigid compartments', and instead dealt with all kinds oflegal issues, 
including foreign investment and multinational enterprises (MNEs), 'on a 
spectrum between the extremes of "national" and "international" law, or 
on one between "private" and "public" law'.4 
With that approach, Detlev Vagts contributed to overcoming the 
public-private split in international law. That catchword denotes the 
distinction between a public and a private realm of life, and goes hand in 
hand with the distinction between State and society, or between State and 
market. The blurring of these spheres seems particularly obvious with 
regard to economic law, and has been reinforced by the phenomenon 
which became generally known as globalisation in the 1990s. But although 
the erosion of the public-private split can usefully be captured with the 
1 H. J. Steinerand D. F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems, 2nd edn. (Westbury, NY: The 
Foundation Press, 1976), xv. 
2 P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956), 2. 
3 Steiner and Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems, supra n. l, xvi. 4 Ibid., xvii. 
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notion 'transnational', conceptual ambiguities and potential misunder-
standings with regard to the key terms remain. After describing traditional 
international law as private law 'writ large', this chapter addresses these 
ambiguities. The chapter then argues - and this its thesis - that inter-
national ( or transnational or global) law has started to go through a 
process of structural differentiation which complements the differentia-
tion along issue-areas. lt concludes by discussing the problems and 
merits of the suggested new structural order of international law. 
The old international law as private law 'writ large' 
Traditional international law (being mainly interstate law) has long been 
conceived as 'private law writ large'. 5 Hersch Lauterpacht famously 
stated that 'formally, international public law belongs to the genus 
private law'.6 The roots of this conception lie in the infancy of the 
discipline of ius naturae et gentium, where States were viewed as analo-
gous to human beings in the State of nature.7 Jus gentium was the law of 
5 T. Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1898), 152. Montesquieu 
described international law as 'le droit civil de l'univers dans le sens que chaque peuple est 
un citoyen'. (Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (Geneva: Barrilot & 
Fils, 1748), livre vingt-sixieme. Des lois dans le rapport qu'elles doivent avoir avec l'ordre 
des choses sur lesquelles elles statuent; chapitre premier - idee de ce livre). 
6 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co, 1927), 81. 
7 See on the analogy between States and individuals as one of the most decisive features 
of the teachings of Hugo Grotius, seminally, H. Lauterpacht, 'The Grotian Tradition of 
International Law', first published in BYBIL, 23 (1946), 1-53, here as published in 
E. Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law. Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, 
vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1970-8), 307-65, e.g. 336. See, for a nuanced treatment, 
C. W olff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica pertractorum, vol. II, trans. J. H. Drake (Frankfurt, 
1764), in J. B. Scott ( ed.), The Classics of International Law ( Oxford: Clarendon, 1934), preface 
(p. 5 of the translation) and §§2-3 (9); E. De Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi 
naturelle, appliques a la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains, vol. I (London, 
1758), in J. B. Scott ( ed.), The Classics of International Law, supra, passim ( e.g. preliminaires, 
para. 18; book II, chap. III (285); J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris: Garnier, 1954 
(orig. 1762)), livre I, chap. VII (245): 'a l'egard de l'etranger, il [the state] devient un etre 
simple, un individu.' Draft of Abbe Gregoire for a declaration of the rights of peoples of 
23 April 1793: '2. Les peuples sont respectivement independants et souverains, quel que soit 
le nombre d'individus qui les composent et l' etendue du territorie qu'ils occupent. Cette 
souverainete est inalienable. 3. Un peuple doit agir a l'egard des autres comme il desire qu'on 
agisse a son egard; ce qu'un homme doit a un homme, un peuple le doit aux autres', in 
W. G. Grewe (ed.), Fantes Historiae Iuris Gentium. Sources Relating to the History of the 
Law of Nations, Bd. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 660 (emphasis added). 
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nature, applied to States. The personification of the State through the 
monarch, and the romantic view of States as living organisms, added 
underpinnings to this picture of the State as a super-person. 
The roots of sovereignty in the institution of property reflect another 
strand of 'privatism'. In the feudal system preceding the emergence of the 
State as an institution, the Lord's dominium over the land (and by 
extension over its inhabitants) had been conceived as private property. 8 
Only Hugo Grotius and contemporaries re-discovered the ancient 
Roman law distinction between dominium ( the power over things and 
unfree persons) and imperium ( the more limited and what we would now 
call 'political' power of magistrates over persons), and began to analyse 
the State's authority as imperium rather than dominium. 9 But even in 
1867, Carl Victor Fricker found it necessary to discuss at length and to 
combat the idea of territory as the State's property, because 'doubtlessly 
the private law view has not yet been overcome in this context' .10 
Moreover, international law has a horizontal structure which corre-
sponds to the ideal-typical private law-like structure. Because States as 
the principal international legal subjects are equally sovereign, they must 
be imagined as sitting on a horizontal plane without any hierarchy 
among them. This image is aptly captured in the old-fashioned 
German term 'genossenschaftliches Recht' for international law. 11 
In private law, the typical form of legal interaction is the 'horizontal' 
conclusion of contracts as opposed to the 'top-down' enactment of laws. 
International treaties are in many ways analogous to private law 
contracts.12 Along that line, the WTO Appellate Body described the WTO 
Agreement of 1994 as follows: 'The WTO Agreement is a treaty - the 
8 F. Kratochwil, 'Sovereignty as Dominium. Is there a Right ofHumanitarian Intervention?', in 
M. Mastanduno and G.M. Lyons (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and 
International Intervention (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995), 21-42, esp. 25-33. Cf. also N. Jansen and R. Michaels, 'Private Law and the State', 
RabelsZ, 71 (2007), 345-97, repr. in N. Jansen and R. Michaels (eds.), Beyond the State. 
Rethinking Private Law (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 15-67, 60. 
9 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis libri Tres, chap. III, sec. IV, vol. II, trans. F. W. Kesley 
et al. (Oxford: Clarendon, London: Humphrey Milford, 1925). 
10 C. V. Fricker, Gebiet und Gebietshoheit, Anhang. Vom Staatsgebiet (Tübingen: Laupp, 
1901 (orig. 1867)), 100-12, quote on 100, trans. by the author. 
11 F. Berber, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, I. Band, Allgemeines Friedensrecht, 2nd edn. 
(Munich: Beck, 1975), 16-19. 
12 This analogy was notably exploited in the heyday of German private law scholarship in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. See C. F. Gerber, Über öffentliche Rechte 
(Tübingen: Laupp & Siebeck, 1852), 40: 'With regard to inter-state treaties, the legal 
form is private law, despite the political contents. The various contracting States oppose 
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international equivalent of a contract. lt is self-evident that in an exercise 
of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national 
interests, the Members of the WTO have rnade a bargain. In exchange 
for benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have 
agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the cornmitment they 
have made in the WTO Agreement.' 13 Also the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) draws heavily on legal institutions 
ultimately derived frorn (Roman) private law, such as füll powers, void-
ability, or denunciation. Before international law prohibited the use of 
force, the possibility of pressuring another State into concluding an 
international treaty under threat or use of military force was the most 
important difference compared to private contracts, consent to which is 
vitiated by duress. 14 This crucial difference has been ternpered by the 
VCLT provision that a treaty is void if it has been procured by the threat 
or use of military force (Art. 52 VCLT), but has not fully disappeared. 
There is still no prohibition of duress against States in all forms (beyond 
the threat of military force). The exercise of economic and political 
pressure in order to force a treaty upon a weaker State is still a common 
practice in international relations. 
The best-known examples are the Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
(BIAs) concluded by the U nited States with some 100 mostly indigent 
countries. These agreements seek to shield US citizens from the jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by providing that US 
government officials, military and other personnel, and US nationals, 
would not be transferred to the ICC by the contracting party. Countries 
were pressured into concluding the agreements by the threat of reduction 
of US Military Education and Training and Military Financing. Numerous 
States lost all US aid in the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 after refusing to 
each other as right-holding single individuals. In the law of nations, a State is treated in 
the same way as an individual, as in private law the human being' (trans. by the author). 
13 Cf. WTO Appellate Body, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (4 October 1996) WT/ 
DS8/AB/R, WT/DSlO/AB/R, WT/DSll/AB/R, 15. 
14 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd edn. (New York: Holt, 1962), 464. See for 
the interwar period under the reign of the League of Nations' limitations on resort to war 
and the contractual prohibition of war by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, L. Oppenheim, 
International Law, 5th edn, vol. I (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1937), 702-3 
(§499)). Here Oppenheim relates that prior international law 'disregarded the effect of 
coercion in the conclusion of a treaty imposed by the victor upon the vanquished States', 
and that for States not bound by the contractual instruments 'there is room for the 
continuance of the traditional rule disregarding the vitiating effect of physical coercion 
exercised against a State'. 
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sign such an agreement. 15 US aid for States such as Benin and Lesotho 
was completely cut back, but was granted after these States signed the 
respective BIA.16 The exercise of economic pressure such as with regard 
to the conclusion of the BIAs does not render any treaty resulting from it 
void.17 
The international law of State responsibility has also been charac-
terised as private-law like. 18 lt serves to protect the rights of one State 
against infringements by others. So the concern of this body of rules is 
more the protection of 'subjective' individual rights and not of an 
'objective' legality which would encapsulate a general public interest. In 
that respect, the law of international responsibility shares a dominant 
feature of private law, and is not like public law. 
Publification or privatisation of international law? 
Against the background of this traditional image of international law, 
two antagonistic legal trends can be discerned. On the one hand, inter-
national law is being publified, on the other hand, it seems to be moving 
ever more in the direction of private law. 
Publification 
Both the emergence of new public-law like features of the international 
legal order, and new readings of pre-existing structures have contributed 
to the perception of an ongoing publification of international law. And 
this publification is mostly welcomed as creating a normativite renforcee 
of that order. 
One example for such a reconstruction is the feminist one. The fem-
inist claim is that international law rests on and reproduces the dichot-
omy between the private and the public sphere because matters 'private' 
to States are considered to be within domestic jurisdiction, whereas 
matters of international 'public' concern are seen to be regulated by 
15 
Overall, the US policyresultedin cut-back of development aid of an estimated $10 billion 
in 2005. 
16 All information on the BIAs is available at www.iccnow.org/?mod=bia. 
17 
The 'Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the 
Conclusion of Treaties', Annex 1 of the Final Act of the Conference on the Law of 
Treaties (ILM, 8 (1969), 733) does not foresee the nullity of a treaty concluded under 
non-military coercion. 
18 A. Nollkaemper, 'Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International 
Responsibility', Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 16 (2009), 535-63, 542-3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL, CRIMINAL AND QUASI-PRIVATE LAW 159 
international law. 19 This approach actually reverses the traditional 
private law image of international law by proclaiming this body of law to 
be 'public' law par excellence and by questioning the distinction as such. 
Beyond this reconstruction, a first tangible aspect of the publification 
of international law lies in the emergence and acknowledgement of 
hierarchy. The relations between international bodies ( organisations, 
treaty bodies, agencies, courts, tribunals) and States are 'vertical' ones. 
These bodies are empowered to render reports, views, decisions and 
judgments which are in some instances legally binding, and in any case 
exert a serious compliance pull. Many of these legal texts are adopted in 
majoritarian proceedings and to that extent escape the consensual 'pri-
vate law' paradigm. The novel types of international law-making, espe-
cially the practice of the global conferences of the 1990s, have therefore 
been characterised as 'law-making in the public interest'.20 
A second and related aspect is the acknowledgement of ius cogens 
norms. Orakhelashvili (among others) asserts that 'one of the effects of 
the introduction of peremptory norms in the international legal system is 
that it partly transforms international law - a horizontal and consensual 
legal order - into a vertical system of law'. 21 Others, on the contrary, 
argue that ius cogens norms 'may not sweep everything away' and that 
these norms should not necessarily take formal precedence over other 
international rules, but should ( only) function as interpretative guide-
lines.22 But both views accept ius cogens as an expression of underlying 
values, or an international ordre public. 
A third strand of publification lies in the distinction between bilateral 
treaties (including multilateral treaties of a bilateral type, consisting of a 
bundle of bilateral obligations) and collective treaties which cannot be 
divided into bilateral obligations. Assuming such a distinction, only the 
truly bilateral treaties are analogous to (private law) contracts. In con-
trast, collective treaties, such as human rights treaties, are concluded in 
the pursuit of a collective interest which transcends the individual 
19 H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin and S. Wright, 'Feminist Approaches to International Law', 
AJIL, 85 (1991), 613-45, 625. 
20 J. Delbrück (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking- International 'Legislation', 
The Public Interest (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997). See also S. Peter, The Idea of 
Public Interest in International Law (PhD, Basel, 2009). 
21 A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2006), 9. In that sense see also D. Shelton, 'Normative Hierachy in International Law', 
AJIL, 100 (2006), 291-323. 
22 A. Bianchi, 'Human Rights and the Magie ofJus Cogens', EJIL, 19 (2008), 491-508, 503-5. 
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interests of the parties. They are therefore comparable to constitutions 
(public law) rather than to contracts (private law). 
A fourth strand of 'publification' (or even 'constitutionalisation') 
concerns the traditional 'private-like' bilateral law of international 
responsibility as described above. This body of law has been publified 
most of all by eliminating the requirement of a legal injury as a condition 
for responsibility. According to the 2001 Articles of the International 
Law Commission on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
W rongful Acts, 23 international State responsibility can arise regardless 
of legal injury of any particular State, but out of 'objective' breaches of 
international law. Moreover, the acknowledgement of the rights of all 
States to invoke responsibility in case of breaches of norms protecting the 
collective interest (Art. 42 lit. b) and Art. 48(1) lit. b) ILC Articles), and 
the imposition of obligations on all States to respond to a serious breach 
of peremptorynorms (Art. 41 ILC Articles) have added a stronger 'public 
law' dimension to the law of responsibility.24 
Finally, the work of international organisations and courts has been 
opened for scrutiny by the public, mostly in response to civil society' s 
pressure for transparency. Publicity is being achieved through the pub-
lication of working documents and through the admission of the inter-
ested public to certain meetings and court sessions. To a limited extent, 
the traditionally secret mode of negotiating diplomacy has been substi-
tuted by an open mode of deliberative governance. Overall, international 
law is becoming 'public' law in the dual sense of the word: a law not only 
in the global public interest, but also open to the public. 
Privatisation 
The contrary trend is the privatisation of international law. But the term 
'privatisation' is in the international sphere as imprecise as in national 
law. lt is used to designate four quite different things. 
First, privatisation means the resort to private law instruments by 
public authorities, such as entering into contracts with citizens, creating 
corporations in order to deliver services and so on. In this weak variant of 
privatisation, public authorities remain public in substance, and merely 
rely on or make use of a private form. 
23 UN Doc. A/63/10. 
24 N ollkaemper, 'International Responsibility', supra n. 18, 545-9 ( qualifying this evolution 
even as 'constitutionalization'). 
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Second, 'privatisation' is used as a short-hand for the increase of 
(political) power of private actors. In that sense, globalisation is a gigan-
tic privatisation, because it shifts power from States to markets. This 
power shift is most obvious where private actors take over formerly 
public functions, such as patrolling streets, controlling traffic, or running 
jails. This variant of privatisation is deep, because here the State and 
public authorities withdraw from activities that have traditionally been 
regarded as incumbent on the State. More and more often, privatisation 
in this sense is at the same time a transnational phenomenon, transgres-
sing the boundaries between domestic and international. The most 
salient example are the private military and security contractors which 
. 1 . b d 25 support nat10na arm1es a roa . 
On the international level, a specific variant of the rise to power of 
non-State actors is their recognition as at least partial subjects of inter-
national law. This means that these actors become the direct addressees 
and beneficiaries of international rules, ranging from human rights to 
investment protection. 
Of course the public-private categories are fluid here as well. For 
instance, international investment law displays public law and private 
law features. An element of privatisation is present in the conclusion of 
so-called 'State contracts' between private investors and States.26 These 
contracts are to some extent denationalised through their reference to 
and incorporation of international legal principles, and by the fact that 
they are enforceable by private actors before international investment 
tribunals. But investment arbitration is distinct from traditional com-
mercial (private) arbitration, because the core of investment disputes are 
the State' s powers to regulate investment, which the State claims to 
exercise in the national public interest.27 The International Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and N ationals 
of other States (ICSID) also differs from commercial arbitration, where 
two private parties agree freely on arbitrators because, in ICISD, the 
25 See on this issue the international code regulating the activities of private military and 
security companies, the Montreux Document of 17 September 2008, Annex to UN Doc. 
A/63/467-S/2008/636 (2008). See from the literature P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. 
The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
26 Steinerand Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems, supra n. 1, 495-513; U. Kischel, State 
Contracts (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1992). 
27 G. van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007), esp. 95-6. 
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State's consent is prospective, and because the arbitration can be trig-
gered only by the investor. 
Third, privatisation also can mean that private actors increasingly 
enact law in the form of general rules with effect for third parties.28 
Law-making in that sense is distinct from concluding contracts by which 
the contracting parties only bind themselves. The creation of such (gen-
eral) norms is arguably a typically public function which from the 
traditional perspective is reserved for public authorities, precisely 
because it has effects on bystanders. 
On the international plane, that third type of privatisation means that 
non-State actors participate in the creation of international law in var-
ious forms. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are observers and 
partly active participants in international conferences, organisations, 
and bodies, and thereby become, at least informally, co-law-makers. 
Transnational business actors adopt corporate codes of conduct. 
Representatives of entire industries elaborate technical, financial and 
book-keeping standards, often in collaboration with civil society repre-
sentatives and governments. 
Fourth, the term 'privatisation' is sometimes associated with the 
question whether a legal order contains different sub-fields called 
'public law' and 'private law'. In those domestic orders which acknow-
ledge the distinction, the rules called 'private law' are State-made, and 
come in the form of codes such as the French Code Civil or the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. These private law codes provide 
the framework for private actors to conclude contracts, and thereby 
allow them to regulate their own affairs in an autonomous fashion. In 
contrast, private law generally does not allow those private actors to 
impose standards on others in the style of a legislator. Private auto-
nomy, which is a fundamental element of the citizens' freedom, legi-
timises private contracting. 
On the international plane, privatisation is mostly of the second and 
third type. The analytical questions arising here are which legal status 
private (economic or civil society) actors have and their effects on 
law-making. The normative question is whether they are legitimately 
entitled to make and to enforce international law. From the traditional 
28 For an interdisciplinary study on this issue, see A. Peters, L. Koechlin, T. Förster and 
G. Penner Zinkernagel (eds.), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); from a private law perspective, see G. Bachmann, Grundlagen 
ziviler Regelsetzung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006). 
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perspective, private rule-making and enforcement can only be explained 
and justified as delegation by the State, whereas a legal pluralist approach 
considers non-State actors as original law-producers. 
New structures within international law 
lt is the thesis of this chapter that international ( or transnational or 
global) law has started to go through a process of structural differentia-
tion. Structural as opposed to issue-specific differentiation means the 
emergence of transnational constitutional, administrative, private and 
criminal law. 
The acknowledgement of these four structural branches provides a 
useful grid for refining the traditional, issue area-wise description of 
international law, ranging from the law of the sea and diplomatic rela-
tions over human rights law to international environmental and climate 
law. These issue-areas have been much expanding, have developed at 
unequal speed and have shaped different legal institutions. These 
dynamics, taken together with the establishment of specialised courts 
and tribunals, have even given rise to the fear of a fragmentation of 
international law29 - a fear which might be alleviated by the insight that 
there is some order in the apparent chaos after all. 
Constitutional law 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars have suggested 
that there is something like an international constitution.30 Seen from a 
less static and more dynamic perspective, one might say that, within 
international law, a special category of constitutional law is emerging.31 
However, it is difficult to exactly delineate and define this evolving 
special category. 
29 Raising the spectre of fragmentation, see G. Guillaume, 'The Future of International 
Judicial Institutions', ICLQ, 44 (1995), 848-62; but see for an optimistic assessment 
R. Higgins, 'A Babel ofJudicial Voices', ICLQ, 55 (2006), 791-805. 
30 A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Vienna: Julius Springer, 
1926), preface; G. Scelle, Precis de droit des gens. Principes et systematique, Deuxieme 
Partie: Droit constitutionnel international (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1934), esp. 4, 9-11; 
H. Waldock, 'General Course on Public International Law', RdC, 106 (1962-II), 5, 7. 
31 J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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Relying on the classic notion of the State constitution as formulated 
by Emer de Vattel, 32 I submit that international constitutional law is 
a sub-set of fundamental international rules and principles which reg-
ulate the political activity and relationships in the global polity. Because 
of their material importance, these norms deserve the label 'constitu-
tional'. They are not codified in one single document, but are dispersed in 
various treaties, 'soft' law texts and customary law. In particular, the UN 
Charter is not the W orld Constitution. The absence of a constitutional 
document means that international constitutional law cannot be easily 
identified through formal criteria. The distinction between constitutional 
law and other international law therefore hinges merely on the rules' 
substance and importance and is necessarily fuzzy. But this problem is 
well known from the British and other unwritten State constitutions. 
Whether the international norms (rules and principles) of potential 
constitutional quality are superior to ordinary international norms, 
whether they are created by States or by other actors as well, whether 
they are always 'hard' legal norms, whether they embody a specific set of 
material principles, and whether they are 'constitutional' only to the 
extent that they are enforceable by some form of judicial review, warrants 
further reflection and debate. 
Administrative law 
Recent scholarship has identified a special branch of international ( or 
transnational, or global) administrative law.33 This branch of law has 
been defined 'as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and 
supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the 
32 '[L] e reglement fondamental qui determine la maniere clont l' Autorite Publique doit etre 
exercee est ce qui forme la Constitution de l'Etat.' E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou 
principes de la loi naturelle appliques a la conduite et aux affaires de Nations et des 
Souverains (London, 1758, repr. Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, 1916), livre I, 
chap. III, §27 (in vol. 3, Engl. trans. p. 17). However, a global or transnational constitu-
tion cannot be gained by simply zoning up a typical State constitution. W e must be aware 
of the problems of translation. This is one reason why the term 'constitutional law' is 
preferable to 'constitution'. 
33 See C. Tietje, Internationalisiertes Verwaltungshandeln (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); 
S. Cassese, 'Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation', 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 37 (2005), 663-94; 
B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law', Law and Contemporary Problems, 69 (2005), 15-61; E. Schmidt-Aßmann, 'Die 
Herausforderung der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die Internationalisierung der 
Verwaltungsbeziehungen', Der Staat, 45 (2006), 315-38. 
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accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring 
they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned 
decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and 
decisions they make'. 34 Transnational administrative law is said to 
resemble domestic administrative law to the extent that there are orga-
nisations vested with authoritative powers and adopting administrative 
decisions, and that there are judges empowered to settle disputes. 35 
But even the proponents of transnational administrative law do not 
draw a watertight line between the transnational public and the private 
realm. Sabino Cassese has particularly emphasised that the 'line between 
public and private is hardly clear at the global level'.36 And Benedict 
Kingsbury and his collaborators count among the 'global administrative 
bodies' also 'hybrid public-private regulatory bodies, and some private 
regulatory bodies exercising transnational governance functions of par-
ticular public significance'. 37 
Moreover, core principles such as due process, proportionality, leg-
ality and transparency have a dual administrative and constitutional 
nature. Any administration should also generally be informed by con-
stitutional values. It is therefore difficult to sharply distinguish global 
administrative law from global constitutional law. 
Criminal law 
International ( or transnational) criminal law is concerned with the 
criminal responsibility of individuals flowing from international custom 
or treaty law. International conventions and even custom have defined 
certain crimes for centuries, but have remained more or less virtual and 
inconsequential until recently. Only with the establishment of interna-
tional criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
and through more active prosecution by domestic courts, has interna-
tional criminal law become a specific structural branch of international 
law. This branch does not exist in clinical isolation but depends on 
the sources and processes of general international law, and on the 
34 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 'Global Administrative Law', supra n. 33, 17. The authors 
define as 'global administrative action' rule-making, adjudication, and decision-making 
that is neither treaty-making nor simple dispute settlement. 
35 Cassese, 'Administrative Law without the State?', supra n. 33, 668. 36 Ibid., 669. 
37 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, 'Global Administrative Law', supra n. 33, 17. 
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domestic criminal law of States. 38 In addition, international criminal law 
simultaneously derives from and continuously draws upon both inter-
national humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. Moreover, the 
enforcement of international criminal law depends first of all on domes-
tic courts, acting as agents of the international community (the principle 
of complementarity). Therefore, most customary rules of transnational 
criminal law have primarily evolved from municipal case-law relating to 
international crimes, chiefly war crimes. Here the courts have derived 
numerous elements, notably the mental components of crimes, from the 
criminal laws of the nation-States. Antonio Cassese has therefore con-
cluded that international criminal law 'is an essentially hybrid branch of 
law: it is public international law impregnated with notions, principles, 
and legal constructs derived from national criminal law, IHL as well as 
human rights law'.39 
The emergence of international criminal law is another aspect of the 
publification of the old interstate law not mentioned so far. Formally, the 
establishment of criminal courts and tribunals introduces a strong element 
of hierarchy into international law. In substance, criminal law foresees the 
prosecution of crimes by a public prosecutor in the public interest, and 
punishment in order to achieve certain social objectives such as the 
prevention of crimes and the re-integration of perpetrators into society. 
Antonio Cassese even perceives a major tension between traditional 
international law (what I call here transnational quasi-private law) and 
international criminal law, resulting from conflicting philosophies.40 
While interstate law is primarily concerned with reconciling the con-
flicting entities of sovereign entities, criminal law aims to punish indivi-
duals transgressing legal standards while at the same time safeguarding 
the rights of accused or suspect persons from arbitrary prosecution and 
punishment. In order to fulfil its purpose, interstate law needs quite a lot 
of flexibility, whereas criminal law, quite to the contrary, requires very 
detailed, clear and unambiguous rules, given that the fundamental rights 
of suspects are at stake. Consequently, the inherent requirements under-
lying transnational criminal law collide with the traditional character-
istics of international law in its old form of 'private law writ large'. 
38 I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law, 3rd edn. (London: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007), 1-2. See on the 'transnational reach of criminal legislation', Steiner 
and Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems, supra n. 1, 854-931. 
39 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 7. 
40 Ibid., 8-9. 
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The remainder of international quasi-private law 
Which areas of international law remain private law-like? These are 
all fields where international law regulates interstate relations, such as 
the international rules of boundaries and on territorial status, the inter-
national law of treaties, and most of the international law of State 
responsibility. Along that line, Joseph Weiler has characterised bilateral 
treaties - for example, the classic friendship and navigation treaties - as 
'private bilateral arrangements' .41 
However, the private law character even of bilateral treaties is ambig-
uous. Friendship and navigation treaties, free trade area agreements, or 
bilateral investment treaties, are 'microscopically . . . indeed, bilateral 
private contracts among States. But telescopically, taken in aggregate 
they define a multilateral regime.'42 
Crucially, is the private law analogy in interstate relations not funda-
mentally flawed if we take into account that, ideal-typically, private law 
intends to further private autonomy, whereas public law is intended to 
serve the general welfare? The flaw arises from the fact that States are -
contrary to the individualistic metaphor pervading the discipline of inter-
national law - not individuals. States are - unlike natural persons - no end 
in themselves. They do not enjoy private autonomy in order to further 
their personal interests, but are moral persons established to facilitate and 
further the well-being of human beings. So States should act as represen-
tatives of their people, and are to that extent not 'private' actors. 
However, this liberal conception of the State is not (yet) the one 
underlying international law. Although international organisations 
such as the United Nations, the OSCE and the OAS currently pursue a 
clear democratisation policy, non-democratic States are still accepted as 
international legal subjects, as treaty partners and as bearers of interna-
tional legal responsibility.43 The private law analogy therefore still cor-
responds to the structure of international law as it stands in all sub-fields 
where States act as unitary actors, meet on an equal footing, and are 
subjects of attribution, and where their rights and interests as moral 
persons are at stake. 
41 J. Weil er, 'The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy', 
ZaöRV, 64 (2004), 547-62, 553, 554 (emphasis added). 
42 Ibid., 554. See also S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
43 Cf. J. d'Aspremont, L'Etat non democratique en droit international (Paris: Pedone, 
2008). 
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Critique of the new structural order 
The re-ordering of international ( or transnational) law into constitutional, 
administrative, criminal and quasi-private law faces objections. The first 
one is that the sub-division of the body of international law into constitu-
tional, administrative, private and criminal is false, because international 
law is neither public nor private but 'simply "international"'.44 Although 
there is merit in the warnings against false domestic analogies, this does 
not compel international lawyers to refrain from differentiations. The 
ongoing development and expansion of international law has transformed 
its rudimentary and oft-stated 'primitive' character. This development and 
refinement requires adequate conceptualisations. There is no need to 
invent new categories if existing ones help map the field. If the problem 
of translation is kept in mind, no harm is done. 
The second important objection is that the categories suggested here 
are historically and geographically contingent.45 Most famously, the 
Common law has been very reluctant to espouse a public law - private 
law distinction. The notion ofEnglish public law is specially contested, as 
if there were something un-English about public law.46 One historical 
explanation for this reluctance is that the reception ( or rather re-
invention) of the ancient Roman distinction between ius publicum and 
ius privatum had not taken place on the British Isles in the same way as it 
had on the European continent.47 Second, Albert Dicey, in his influential 
constitutional treatise, opposed the idea of an English public law and 
somewhat overstated the difference between English ( Common) law and 
the French droit administratif.48 
In that tradition, some administrative lawyers have argued against the 
need for a distinction between public and private law in the English legal 
44 A. Pellet, 'Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!', EJIL, 10 (1999), 425-34, 433. 
45 Seminally on the contingency of the public law-private law distinction, see M. Bullinger, 
Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968). 
46 M. Freedland, 'The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English Law', 
in J.-B. Auby and M. Freedland (eds.), La Distinction du droit public et du droit prive. 
Regards fran<;:ais et britanniques (Paris: editions Pantheon-Assas, 2004), 101-20, 103. 
47 See on this re-invention, M. Stolleis, 'Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht im Prozeß der 
Entstehung des modernen Staates', in W. Hoffmann-Riehm and E. Schmidt-Aßmann 
(eds.), Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnung (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1996), 41-61, 45-51. 
48 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1959; repr. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1982), chapter XII 'Rule of law 
compared with droit administratif, 213-73. 
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system.49 In contrast, other English authors maintain and defend the 
distinction. so Given that controversy, it cannot be said that the distinc-
tion between private law and public law is unknown in the Common law 
in order to use this as an argument against the viability of the distinction 
on the international plane. 
The third objection is that especially the distinction between adminis-
trative and private law is notoriously problematic because the employed 
criteria ( such as public interest versus private interests, or hierarchy versus 
horizontality) do not give rise to unequivocal results. For instance, in 
probably all modern codifications of private law, many public interests 
are endorsed, ranging from the protection of consumer and tenants to 
antidiscrimination. And private international law, formally adopted and 
developed by national law-makers, has the (global) 'public' function of 
regulatory ordering by effecting a regulatory system of distributed 'peer 
governance', whose objective is to reduce conflicts.51 lt is therefore unsur-
prising that some areas of domestic law - such as competition law, public 
procurement law, or intellectual property law - do not clearly fit into one 
of the categories, and are therefore treated either as a part of public law or 
as a part of private law in different jurisdictions. 
A related aspect is that the current trends of liberalisation and priva-
tisation mentioned above have further undermined the already fuzzy 
distinction between public and private law. Governments and bureau-
cracies increasingly make use of private law instruments and tools, 
ranging from new public management over benchmarking to auctions. 
All these considerations counsel against insisting on a clear-cut distinc-
tion between public and private law. 
A fourth objection is that the erection of a new public-private split in 
transnational relations is backward-looking, runs counter to the modern 
trend and risks reduplicating artificial barriers that have already been 
overcome in domestic law. In that sense, the 'public/private classification' 
49 C. Harlow, 'Public and Private Law. Definition without Distinction', Modern Law 
Review, 43 (1980), 241-65. See further for an argument against the distinction between 
public and private law in English law, 0. Dawn, Common Values and the Public-Private 
Divide (London: Butterworths, 1999). The author argues that both fields oflaw are about 
the control of power, are concerned to uphold authority and to protect the interests of 
good administration, and have to balance conflicting considerations (11). See also 
chapter 11 (248-66): 'There is no public-private divide.' 
5° Freedland, 'The Evolving Approach', supra n. 46, 115. Still, Freedland perceives an unduly 
deep split both at the practical or positive law and at the theoretical or doctrinal level. 
51 A. Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), esp. 299, 308. 
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has been condemned as being 'wholly irrelevant to the organization of 
modern society', and as 'nothing more than an attempt by the judiciary to 
shield from public criticism some highly executive-minded decisions'. 52 
The final objection is the one to be expected by authors like Detlev 
V agts, namely that the line between public and private law is especially 
fuzzy at the global level, and that this is exactly what the term 'transna-
tional' seeks to signify. 53 
However, as demonstrated on pp. 160-3, the so-called erosion of the 
public and the private sphere is a complex issue which encompasses very 
different strands, especially on the global plane. It was right and impor-
tant to call into question the existence of a bright and clear distinction. 
Moreover, the lasting analytical contribution of the concept of transna-
tional law has been that it encompasses all kinds of law not made by 
States, and that it shifts the focus from the creators of legal rules to those 
rules' functioning and real effects. But the ongoing process of sophistica-
tion of international law now requires a fresh look. Generally speaking, 
the public law - private law distinction has not proven epistemically 
worthless and normatively undesirable, and should not be abandoned 
lightly. The fundamental reason is that this distinction reflects the 
difference between iustitia distributiva (tobe realised through distribu-
tive policies) and iustitia compensativa ( as realised in the private sphere 
and through the market).54 It is therefore unsurprising that, in structural 
terms, differences between both areas of law concerning the regulatory 
objectives, the structure of interests involved, the steering conceptions 
and steering modes, the sanctions and the culture of implementation 
do persist in important jurisdictions. 55 The conclusion is that it might 
be worth considering keeping both fields of law distinct while legal 
techniques should be employed to facilitate their adequate interaction 
52 Harlow, 'Public and Private Law', supra n. 49, 256, 265. 
53 But note that the erosion of the public-private distinction is not mentioned as a 
characteristic feature of transnational economic law by C. Tietje and K. Nowrot, 
'Laying Conceptual Ghosts of the Past to Rest. The Rise of Philip Jessup's 
"Transnational Law" in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic 
System', in C. Tietje, A. Brouder and K. Nowrot (eds.), Philip Jessup's Transnational 
Law Revisited. On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of its Publication (Halle and 
Saale, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht 50, February 2006), 17-43, 28-9. 
54 Jansen and Michaels, 'Private Law and the State', supra n. 8, 62. 
55 See, for German law, W. Hoffmann-Riehm, 'Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht als 
wechelseitige Auffangordnungen - Systematisierung und Entwicklungsperspektiven', 
in W. Hoffmann-Riehm and E. Schmidt-Aßmann (eds.), Öffentliches Recht und 
Privatrecht als wechselseitige Auffangordnung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), 261-337. 
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and mutual complementation. I submit that this should be the research 
programme for international ( or transnational) law as well. 
Condusion: towards a new structural order 
What is the epistemological and practical use of introducing or transplant-
ing the categories of constitutional, administrative and criminal law into the 
international sphere? First, the acknowledgement of different structural 
branches of transnational ( or international) law helps to identify the appro-
priate types of legal instruments and institutions for the different branches. 
For instance, international criminal law requires a public prosecutor, and 
arguably international climate law, forming part of international adminis-
trative law, requires a similar institution. In contrast, the enforcement of a 
bilateral visa regime can be left to the involved States. 
Second, it is in this perspective conceivable that different principles 
apply in the different structural branches. For example, formality is not 
important in quasi-private interstate relations. In contrast, international 
criminal law must observe strict legality and formality, whereas this is 
somewhat less important in international administrative law ( although 
not entirely negligible, because formality safeguards the accountability of 
the international administrative bodies). For this reason, it would be 
important to qualify the freezing of assets of individuals on the basis of 
UN Security Council antiterrorism resolutions either as a measure of 
criminal law or as administrative action. Depending on that qualifica-
tion, a different set of rights accrues to the affected individual, and the 
presumption of innocence applies, or does not. 
The reconstruction proposed here implies that international constitu-
tional law furnishes the overarching principles which should serve as a 
guideline for the interpretation of all other international rules. But it also 
provides an argument against the overconstitutionalisation of interna-
tional law. It leads to the insight that not all fields of international law 
suffer from similar legitimacy deficits and that not all fields equally need 
democratisation. 
Third, the structural ordering acknowledges that, although the human 
being is the ultimate subject of all law, including international law,56 
individual interests are not equally affected in all areas of international 
56 G. Scelle, Precis de Droit des Gens, Principes et Systematique, vol. I, Introduction, le 
milieu intersocial (Paris: Sirey, 1932), 42: 'Les individus seuls sont sujets de droit en droit 
international public.' See also H. Kelsen, 'Les Rapports de Systeme entre le Droit Interne 
172 ANNE PETERS 
law and by all types of international and transnational governance. 
International law also protects and should protect the national interest 
of States ( which act ideally, but not always in reality as representatives of 
their citizens). Finally, international law protects and should even more 
strongly protect the (global) public interest which cannot in all situations 
be simply deduced from the sum of individual well-being, but which 
necessarily transcends individual preferences to some extent. 57 
This also means that sovereignty plays a different role depending on the 
structural branch of international law in question. In the private law-like 
areas, State sovereignty indeed plays a role akin to property. 58 Seen as 
analogous to private property, sovereignty allows States to exclude others 
from their territory, and to use and convey their territories ( and those 
territories' inhabitants) at will. Sovereignty-as-property guarantees States 
a manoeuvring space and shields them against foreign interference. 
Crucially, sovereignty-as-property also shields the sovereign-owner from 
moral considerations, because a property right entitles the owner even to 
do immoral things, as long as she remains within her territorially limited 
domain. In contrast, in the more administrative law-like areas of transna-
tional law, sovereignty must be conceived of as popular sovereignty, with 
the State acting as an agent or trustee. And this leads to the idea of 
sovereignty as engendering a responsibility to protect. 
In the law of treaties, the distinction between private law-like treaties 
and public law-like treaties has important practical effects concerning the 
responses to breaches of treaties through adjudication or countermea-
sures. 59 One consequence is that with regard to multilateral treaties 
which only contain a bundle of parallel bilateral obligations (private law-
like treaties), individual parties should be allowed to renegotiate their 
'contract' as long as they do not affect the individual rights of other parties 
to that treaty. A defaulting State should be allowed to pay compensation 
instead of being forced to comply with the treaty if this engenders welfare 
et le Droit International Public', RdC, 14 (1926/IV), 231-329, 281: 'L'idee qu'il y aurait 
entre l'Etat et les individus, et par suite d'Etat a Etat, des rapports qui ne seraient pas des 
rapports entre individus est une simple illusion, qui ne s'explique que par l'inadmissible 
hypostase de l'Etat en un surhomme.' J. L. Brierly, 'Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix', 
RdC, 58 (1936/IV), 5-237, 47: 'en derniere analyse, seuls les individus sont susceptibles 
d'etre sujets de ce droit-la [i.e. international law].' 
57 This is the case notably with regard to the preservation of global commons, ranging from 
world peace over the climate and tropical forests to the humane genome. 
58 See the text accompanying nn. 8 and 9. 
59 For an excellent discussion, see J. Pauwelyn, 'A Typology of Multilateral Treaty 
Obligations. Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?', EJIL, 14 (2003), 
907-52. 
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gains for the involved parties (the idea of an 'efficient breach'). In contrast, 
in the event of a breach of a genuinely collective (public law-like) treaty, a 
party breaching the contract should not be allowed to buy itself out of 
compliance through paying compensation, just as a perpetrator and a 
victim cannot settle on a crime because of the public interest in not having 
that breach or crime committed in the first place. 
Overall, the account of emerging international constitutional, admin-
istrative, private and criminal law allows us to better understand the 
differences between some sub-areas, but also highlights commonalities 
between others. lt helps to order the apparent chaos and thereby it is apt 
to alleviate the fear that the normative power of international law might 
be weakened by conflicting rules and contradictory judgments and 
decisions issued by the multiple international courts and bodies. The 
insights gained by the identification of different structural branches help 
us to appraise the current developments as normal and potentially even 
benign processes of differentiation rather than as malignant dispersion 
and as a source of conflict and confusion. 
Most importantly, the reconstruction - or, rather, re-ordering - of 
international law suggested here enables legal analysts to resolve the 
current puzzle presented by the simultaneous existence of seemingly 
contradictory trends such as the erosion of sovereignty on the one 
hand and the unwavering importance of statehood on the other hand, 
and of 'privatisation' on the one side, and 'publification' on the other. 
These seemingly contradictory trends show a process of differentiation. 
The structural order proposed here might have some explanatory power 
and offers a normative guideline in that regard. 
